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Abstract. This paper offers new arguments to reject the alleged dream of immortality. 
In order to do this, I firstly introduce an amendment to Michael Hauskeller’s approach 
of the “immortalist fallacy”. I argue that the conclusion “we (normally) do not want 
to live forever” does not follow from the premise “we (normally) do not want to die”. 
Next, I propose the philosophical turn from “normally” to “under these circumstances” 
to resolve this logical error. Then, I review strong philosophical critiques of this trans-
humanist purpose of immortality in the literature. There are two key questions related 
to the possibility of fulfilling this goal: the hard problem of consciousness and the 
personal identity dilemma. Finally, I defend a specific type of indefinite life and justify 
that it is more desirable than our current limited life.
Keywords: Immortalist fallacy; immortality; indefinite life; transhumanism.
Introduction
An optimistic vision of future technology
Let me confess an almost daily concern: I do not want to die today. I am 
confident that I will not want to die tomorrow either. My anxiety about 
dying is based on my fear of the moment in which my conscious life will 
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end. I cannot imagine what it would be like if I ceased to exist. This fear is 
an emotion which invades my mind and I can hardly suppress. Once dead, 
I will not be able to enjoy admiring the sunset in Oriental Bay, reading The 
Divine Comedy, or watching Blade Runner 2049 again. This concern is not 
mine alone: it drives the philosophy of existentialists, and much of both 
Eastern and Western religious thought.1 My anxiety may have deep-seated 
evolutionary origins, and it even seems to be shared by other animals. Will 
there ever be a solution to this common fear?
The advancement of science and technology in the past half-century is 
opening up unprecedented horizons. The world is transforming, everything 
is changing—not only in terms of the way we live, but also in terms of how 
long. With science and technology increasingly pushing back the frontier of 
death, is it possible that the “death of death” will be fulfilled in the distant 
future? (Wood 2016). There is a distinguished group of thinkers who proclaim 
the advent of the Singularity, where the evolution of Homo sapiens will be 
directed by ourselves. The Singularity refers to the point in time when all 
the advances in science and technology will cause unimaginable biological, 
cultural, and social changes, impossible to predict or understand before 
this event. In the Singularity, there will be no distinction between humans 
and machines, or between physical and virtual world. Raymond Kurzweil 
(2005, Ch. 1) suggests that we think about the way in which technology has 
evolved over the past 100 years and project it into the future: there will be 
an exponential growth of diverse forms of technological progress after which 
the meaning of human life will be radically different. In this future, we will 
conquer the fear of an inevitable death by eliminating the inevitability of 
death itself. Many of the defenders of the Singularity typically endorse some 
version of transhumanism (H+). 
1 I do not deny that this debate would be radically different for an atheist compared to 
someone who believes in an afterlife. For the former, death is the end of our life. For the 
latter, death is only the end of our biological and earthly life before entering another 
plane of existence. My arguments hold for any rational person, regardless of their spiritu-
al beliefs or lack thereof.
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H+ is a philosophical, scientific-technological, and social way of thinking 
about the transformation of human beings. It provides opportunities by 
developing emerging technologies to extraordinarily enhance ourselves.2 
H+ will enable our society to be healthier, longer-lived, and smarter, capable 
of selecting from a wide range of enhanced attributes and new traits. Nick 
Bostrom (2008) or Anders Sandberg (2014), among others, present possible 
advantages and disadvantages—that is to say, benefits and risks—of these 
emerging technologies that could overcome traditional conditions in 
cognition, longevity, or physical performance. Their premise is that human 
beings at present do not enjoy the best of all possible states of existence. 
Thus, the human condition is questioned, it is no longer sacrosanct as some 
essentialists have defended (Kass 2003; Sandel 2007). On the basis of their 
optimistic vision of future technology, they want to free human beings from 
our biological chains, including death. Transhumanists justify this vision 
based on the assurance that technology is growing faster than we could 
have ever imagined, and it offers a new range of infinite possibilities and 
powers. In other words, today’s science-fiction is a glimpse at tomorrow’s 
reality. But what kind of world does technology have in store for us?
Digital immortality: The transhumanist dream
In a philosophical paper on life extension, Larry Temkin (2008) wonders 
whether living longer is inherently living better. In this work, I begin with 
the claim that I want to live longer, regardless of whether that means living 
better than I do now. This starting point raises a significantly different 
question: “Does wanting to live longer entail wanting to live forever?” (Agar 
2010, Ch. 6; Gems 2003; Williams 1973). 
From the perspective of H+, living longer is the first step towards the 
ultimate goal of conquering death. This perspective envisions no limits 
to humanity’s ability for continuous enhancement. Furthermore, the de-
2 There is an extensive academic literature about the ideas defended by transhumanists 
in which the arguments for and against are exhaustively reviewed (Agar 2010; Diéguez 
2017). See more briefly, Asla (2019); Hauskeller (2019).
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struction of the biosphere will not be an obstacle to our survival, if the 
form of immortality that the Singularity offers is not biological. For some 
transhumanists, while the body is simply “jelly” (Moravec 1989, 117), our 
minds may be uploaded into a computer (which is eternally functional) 
and, in this way, achieve digital immortality. Transhumanists claim that 
our hardware, like the human body, will be disposable. What will remain 
in perpetuity is our software, even enhanced by future technology. We will 
be able to transfer our ideas or memories into virtual world in which we 
will live better than we live now. David J. Chalmers explains (destructive) 
mind uploading as follows:
One possible form involves serial sectioning. Here one freezes a brain, and 
proceeds to analyze its structure layer-by-layer. In each layer one records the 
distribution of neurons and other relevant components, along with the character 
of their interconnections. One then loads all this information into a computer 
model that includes an accurate simulation of neural behavior and dynamics. 
The result might be an emulation of the original brain (2010, 42).
H+ (implicitly) defends (destructive) mind uploading because the biological 
chains are entirety gone by this point. The idea of digital immortality is 
a form of life extension in which we would live forever and never die. The 
result might look like an avatar behaving, thinking, and reacting like a person 
on the basis of that person’s digital archive. In this line, Kurzweil (2005, Ch. 
7) considers that digital immortality is forever as long as someone takes 
care of the information. In a very strict sense, even this immortality would 
not be absolute. Some may claim that this transhumanist purpose of im-
mortality would never be possible. Imagine that our digital selves are erased 
by a computer virus or the heat-death of the universe. However, I approach 
digital immortality as if it were a possibility for complete immortality: life 
without an end, with “life” no longer being tied to biological limitations. 
In contrast to digital immortality, indefinite life is a form of life extension 
in which humans have already cured aging but they can die from external 
causes, such as accidents, dehydration, or murder, among other possibilities 
(Glannon 2002, 343–344). Life is (potentially) forever, in biological terms. 
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Even though life extension technology offers us the possibility to live and 
longer, even forever, we would remain vulnerable to the possibility for life 
to end, as “life” is tethered to biology.3
Immortality is a hypothetical scenario for which imagination is nec-
essary because of the absolute lack of scientific-technological evidence. 
Accordingly, immortality is neither an expected nor a realistic result of 
treating aging. What is more, an extreme longevity, similar to Methuselah’s 
life, does not imply that one can live forever. The goal of the rest of this 
paper is to reject the alleged dream of immortality. My structure will be 
as follows: in section 2, I will introduce an amendment to the immortalist 
fallacy (IF), inspired by Michael Hauskeller’s approach (2013). In section 3, 
I will review strong philosophical critiques of this transhumanist purpose 
of immortality in the literature: the hard problem of consciousness and 
the personal identity dilemma. Finally, in section 4, I will conclude the 
paper by suggesting a specific type of indefinite life derived from section 1 
and justified by section 2 that it could be more desirable than our current 
limited life. Thus, I will argue that this does not only change our concept 
of “death”, but also our concept of “life”.
1. The immortalist fallacy: An amendment  
to Hauskeller’s approach
1.1. A logical error? 
Everyone wants to enjoy as much time as possible with their loved ones, as 
long as their cognitive and physical capacities are tolerable, broadly speaking. 
3 Nicholas Agar makes this distinction between a zero and non-zero immortality: “There’s 
actually a big difference between immortality and negligible senescence. Whereas a neg-
ligible senescence being is likely to have a longer life span than a senescing one, an im-
mortal being is guaranteed to. Immortal beings have a zero probability of dying over any 
future period of time. Negligible senescent beings have, in contrast, a nonzero probability 
of dying with each year that passes. The difference between them and us as we are now 
is that this probability does not increase” (2010, 113). Broadly speaking, we refer to the 
same distinction. However, I prefer to call it “indefinite life” because I argue that death is 
possible beyond the cure of aging. 
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Many of us want more time for other purposes as well, like reading classic 
novels, visiting exotic countries, and watching cult movies, among other 
things. From this perspective, living longer could be better for humans.4 
Many transhumanists doubt that there is anyone who rejects the dream of 
immortality (Bostrom 2008). Now, I discuss that most radical view of the 
life extension possibilities: living forever and never die.
Transhumanists argue that any significant extension of life we would 
turn us into better humans, in the sense that we would be better off than 
we are now. They assume that we appreciate being alive (life is good) and 
that we do not want to die (death is bad). Bostrom uses these premises to 
construct his main argument: (1) people “normally” appreciate being alive; 
(2) accordingly, they “normally” desire not to die; (3) they also have an 
(implicit) desire to have their life spans indefinitely extended; and (4) thus, 
they normally desire to live (potentially) forever (2008, 113–118). Bernard 
Williams, in his famous seminar chapter on immortality, stated a similar 
conclusion: “[W]anting something itself gives one a reason for avoiding 
death” (2000: 59). I assume a moderate position in this debate, but in order 
to establish it I first have to answer these two questions: (1) “Do we never 
want to die?”; and (2) “Do we want to live forever?”. A useful starting point 
is Hauskeller’s approach (2013), which argues that Bostrom (2008) commits 
what the calls the IF in making his four-step arguments:
[T]his argument, plausible as it may seem at first sight, is misleading, because 
it is based on the premise that we (normally) do not want to die, which is then 
taken to imply that we do want live forever (i.e. have an implicit desire for 
indefinite life extension). Yet this conclusion is in fact not warranted. If you ask 
people whether they want to die, most of them will indeed deny it. However, 
if you as, the same people whether they want to go on living forever, you may 
find that most will deny this too (…). It is quite possible that a person does not 
want to die and still does not want to live forever. On the face of it his seems 
4 In this paper, I assume a welfarist concept of living better. This concept entails several 
changes in anthropology, morality, or psychology, which “increase the chances of leading 
a good life in the relevant set of circumstances” (Savulescu et al. 2011, 16). I do not believe 
that the meaning of life can be considered by religious or traditional doctrines. 
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to be a blatant contradiction. How can we at the same time not want to die and 
not want to live forever? Obviously, if you do not die you will live forever and 
the only way to avoid living forever is to die (2013, 89–90).
Hauskeller uses his critique of Bostrom’s argument to reject the alleged 
dream of immortality. He argues that there is no logical entailment between 
the claim that “people (normally) do not want to die” and “people (normally) 
want to live forever”. In my view, the key to dismantling Bostrom’s argument 
is the qualifier of the premise: “normally”. My position does not only serve 
as an amendment to Hauskeller’s approach, but also as a distinct framework 
to reject the dream of immortality of transhumanists. 
That a person does not “normally” want to die does not imply that 
the same person does not ever want to die (i.e. in the future). To clarify 
Hauskeller’s approach, I propose a philosophical turn from “normally” to 
“under these circumstances”. What does “normal” mean for Bostrom or 
Hauskeller in the IF? They do not clarify whether it is “ideally”, “generally”, 
“most of the time”, or “most people”. There are many possible meanings 
which would substantially change the argument. I understand “under these 
circumstances” as the anthropological, historical, psychological, and social 
context according to which every individual makes a claim about the IF. I do 
not want to die “under these circumstances” perhaps something that we all 
think by living a limited life now implies an implicit desire to live forever 
under these circumstances. This implicit desire to live forever is conditioned 
by two reasons: (1) I want to be alive today; (2) and I do not want to die 
today. I respond to the IF in my present. I cannot know what I would say in 
my future under other circumstances.5 The fear of death justifies my desire 
to live indefinitely, more than anything else.
Hauskeller thinks about the IF as a mortal human being, like any of 
us. Moreover, Bostrom and Kurzweil remain human beings, beyond their 
optimistic vision of future technology. They remain locked in the chains 
5 With other words, I can say that it is incoherent to have any opinion about the attractive-
ness of living forever, or even of living to 1000, or only 100, because it is axiomatic that 
whether one wants to die now (or soon) depends on one’s perceived quality of life at the 
time and in the subsequent future. I owe this comment to Aubrey de Grey.
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of biology. Death is the “inevitable destiny” of transhumanists if their 
dream does not come true. All of us are in the same scenario and we all 
project a future world that spans beyond our current limited life. The 
substantial difference between us is the new world that we want now. 
Thus, this reflection depends strongly on the context of every individual. 
I take a metaphysical step from Hauskeller’s approach since I consider two 
possible scenarios in the IF: (a) the people being described are mortal; 
(b) the people being described are already immortal. For me, Hauskeller’s 
question: “How can we at the same time not want to die and not want to 
live forever?” (2013, 90) should be substituted by the statement: “We can 
under different circumstances not want to die and not want to live forever”. 
I propose dissolving the contradiction by showing different responses in 
these opposing scenarios. We can desire or reject the dream of immortality, 
but we do it under current circumstances, according to which our life is 
limited and death is possible.
In the first scenario, in which we are mortals, we are delaying the hands 
of the clock. Time is against us and death will come eventually. In the second 
scenario, in which we are already immortal, we would live without having 
to look at the clock. The clock does not exist anymore. In the first scenario, 
death is the “inevitable destiny” because mortal beings are all condemned 
to die, no matter how long we are able to delay our end. In the second sce-
nario, death could be a “salvation” if it were the only way to move beyond 
our temporal existence. Otherwise, life would be a prison from which we 
could never escape. According to Hauskeller’s approach, death would not 
always be something bad. 
1.2. Is death always bad?
I have amended Hauskeller’s approach to the IF to suggest that where he 
qualifies his claims with “normally”, it would be better to say “under these 
circumstances”. Now, I evaluate the concept of “death” from my previous 
division between mortals and immortals. I follow Hauskeller’s approach. 
As he says:
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Yet even if we should decide that death is indeed an evil, non-death (or living 
forever) need not be a good. From the fact that a person does not want to die 
it follows neither that (a) death is an evil to them, nor that (b) living forever 
is a good to them. If this were a valid argument, which it is not, then we could 
just as easily conclude from the fact that a person does not want to live forever, 
that, to them, (a) life is an evil and (b) dying is a good (2013, 99).
Like Hauskeller, I strongly argue that the desire to live forever does not the 
imply desire not to die. The philosophical turn from “normally” to “under 
these circumstances” also shows how death could be “bad” or “good” 
depending on the context of every individual. For many people, the case 
a persistent vegetative state is an example of a situation in which death 
might be considered a “salvation” rather than an “inevitable destiny”. There 
is nothing in the desire not to die that infers that living forever is an inher-
ently desire. The question is conditioned by the type of life that we would 
live.6 Following Hauskeller’s approach, but incorporating my amendment, 
I present the concept of death in the IF:
1. That a person does not want to die does not imply that either (a) death is 
bad to this person, or that (b) living forever is a good to this person. That 
a person does not want to die implies that this person wants to avoid it 
under a specific set of circumstances. That a person does not want to die 
implies that this person to be alive under these circumstances, but not that 
this person wishes to be immortal.
2. That a person does not want to live forever does not imply that either (a) life 
is bad to this person, or that (b) death is a good to this person. That a person 
does not want to live forever implies that this person wants to die under 
a specific set of circumstances. That a person does not want to live forever 
implies that this person to be alive today, but not forever.
6 In the previous case the decisive reason was health. There are examples where the most 
influential factors are the culture and time. Hara-kiri, is the classic Japanese ritual suicide 
by disembowelment. Samurai voluntarily stuck a dagger into their stomachs so as not to 
fall into the hands of the enemy or to atone for dishonor, or for a failure. 
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Death is not essentially “bad” or “good”, “undesirable” or “desirable”—
and either is life. I have proposed that whether death is seen as an “inev-
itable destiny” or as a “salvation” depends entirely on the circumstances 
of a person’s life. Someone who is happy with the good experiences that 
life can provide may have compelling reasons to want to keep having those 
experiences indefinitely—or at least until they no longer seem so good. 
However, someone could say that death could be avoided is only if we 
wished to (there would always be a way out). In this vein, I will explain 
what I call the obligatory nature of immortality in H+. Taking this as 
a baseline, I will defend my own concept of death related to the IF. Similarly, 
I will present my concept of “life” according to this obligatory nature of 
immortality in section 4. First, the Singularity is the point in time at which 
all the advances in technology will change the world as we know it today. 
This event will affect all humans without exception (Kurzweil 2005, Ch. 1). 
In other words, transhumanists seem to assume that all these changes will 
be universally accepted. Second, digital immortality through that the (de-
structive) mind uploading would guarantee one could live forever and never 
die. Would technological suicide be possible? For these transhumanists, it 
is rather strange to end life when we have conquered death technologically 
after centuries. Kurzweil says that if we take care of the information, we 
will never die. Could we totally cease to exist after our upload? Someone 
could also consider that this possibility implies that the only true form of 
immortality would be an indefinite life. According to the above, I justify 
what I have introduced previously in relation to the IF: (1) death is the 
“inevitable destiny” in our current limited life; and (2) death would be the 
“salvation” in immortality only if it were possible. And transhumanists seem 
to disagree with one scenario in which death could be optional.
I have started my discussion with this question: “Do you never want to 
die?”. Rather, we should ask: “Do you never want to die under the current 
circumstances?”. Along this line, John Harris says: “Most people fear death, 
and the prospect of personal extended life-span is likely to be welcomed” 
(2000: 59). Absolutely. Transhumanists promise to live forever because 
they know that the fear of death would entail the acceptance of any type 
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of life. Anything would be better than nothing for them. These authors 
consider that the IF to be meaningless, and conceptualize only a single 
scenario in which they conquer death and live forever. Thereby, I have 
already presented a possible solution to the first question at the beginning 
of this section: “Do we not want to die?”. No. Broadly speaking, and under 
tolerable circumstances, today we want to be alive. Tomorrow life itself 
might show us a world that we may prefer to escape through death. One of 
the most difficulties is to predict how events in our lives will unfold from 
one day to the next.
Having shown the logical error from the perspective of individual desire, 
I take one metaphysical step. If wanting to live forever were our desire, 
would (destructive) mind uploading be possible? Would future technology 
solve all the challenges of digital immortality?
2. Serious arguments to reject digital immortality 
2.1. Strong philosophical critiques 
I have presented my amendment to Hauskeller’s approach to the IF (sec-
tion 2). Now, I consider it useful to review the critiques that of the dream of 
immortality that are raised in the literature. Transhumanists have already 
shown all the (possible) benefits that (destructive) mind uploading would 
have—and how it would improve people’s lives in all their aspects. For in-
stance: (1) people could create multiple avatars of themselves to accomplish 
their goals; (2) people could enjoy unimaginable pleasures for our senses; 
or (3) people could save an emergency copy of their profiles. However, 
I point out different problems that this type of “life” could pose for us in 
the distant future. Everything is speculative, but I also think a scenario not 
as desirable as the one proposed by transhumanists. From this perspective, 
it is not only about the individual desire to want to live forever but also 
about whether this desire can be fulfilled technologically. Transhumanists 
imagine what they would like to happen. Where there is a will, there is 
(not always) a way. Perhaps this (great) difficulty is what really concerns 
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transhumanists. Hence, I argue that there are strong reasons to show that 
the transhumanist goal is not an easy one. 
By “strong” critiques, I understand those that directly undermine the very 
concept of digital immortality. Not surprisingly, there are serious difficulties 
in meeting this goal from a technological perspective. Here, I follow the 
ideas of Chalmers (2010) who argues that there are two key issues in the 
(destructive) mind uploading debate: the hard problem of consciousness and 
the personal identity dilemma. Therefore, my rejection of digital immortality 
is related to these two questions: (1) “Will an uploaded version of me be 
conscious?”; and (2) “Will I, upon uploading, still be me?”. The concept of 
mind that Bostrom (2008) or Kurzweil (2005) defend is quite widely discussed 
in neuroscience and philosophy. They assume that the mind is something 
analogous to software, to an information pattern that can be transferred 
to different hardware and function correctly. Consciousness would be one 
of those functions, such as the ability of my laptop to monitor its own 
functionality, to distinguish self from non-self by identifying computer 
viruses, and to understand voice commands. However, many thinkers show 
that this is a reduced version of who we are and that we hardly know what 
consciousness is—besides, we are not certain at all that it is everything that 
makes us who we are. Even supposing that consciousness were not a problem, 
the personal identity dilemma would still be present. For instance, if I could 
make copies of my mind, or I could transfer it to a silicon device, nothing 
would guarantee me that “he”, “she”, or “that” is myself (Hopkins 2012; 
Pigliucci 2014). Agar shows this dilemma in relation to different possible 
scenarios after the uploading. In short:
There are two possible consequences of uploading. The advocates of strong AI 
think that the computers we are uploaded into are capable of conscious thought. 
If Kurzweil is right, you will not only survive, but your powers of thought will 
be radically enhanced. If the doubters are right, then uploading is a nothing 
more than a novel way to commit suicide (2010, 63).
We would try to avoid death by uploading our minds into a machine, but 
we could die in the process. If this is the case, then (destructive) mind 
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uploading would just be a sophisticated way to end our lives. Even more, 
I suggest that we are afraid of death but we are not aware that we could face an 
even more fearful future. The most frightening monsters are not dragons or 
witches; they are those that we cannot yet imagine. There is a third possible 
scenario besides mind uploading way to end our lives or the transhumanist 
success: we have survived but neither us nor the world around us is what 
we really wanted. In this vein, João Pedro de Magalhães proposes a similar 
idea when he says that:
Due to the both creative and destructive nature of the human mind, the dilemma 
is whether the technological singularity will be a bridge to wonderland or if it 
will mean the end of human civilization (2004, 85).
This nightmare of immortality characterizes the possible scenario triggered 
resulting from H+ in which we would be obliged to accept not only all the 
technological changes of the Singularity, but also the impossibility of ceasing 
to exist. After the Singularity, the type of life that we would live would be 
radically different from our current ones, and according to H+, these new 
lives would be much better than anything that we can dream of. Now, we 
imagine our lives projected towards a vague, abstract idea of finality, knowing 
we are mortal (cf. Kitcher 2014, 99–100). A serious for everyone to consider 
would be: “Do you know what mind uploading would be to say yes to the 
transhumanist dream?”.
Typically, only the two extreme options of the debate are presented 
for consideration by the wider society: essentialist mortality (Kass 2003) 
and digital immortality (Kurzweil 2005). However, it is possible that most 
people unknowingly hold a moderate position like the one that Hauskeller 
and I have described previously. Based on my amendment to the IF, they 
would want to keep living indefinitely as long as they can live under their 
current circumstances. They would not want to live forever because they 
can imagine themselves under other circumstances in which they would 
rather die. The probability of seeing paradise on Earth is the same as that 
of seeing hell. What is more, they are not two sides of a coin since we do 
not even know whether there are two or more options.
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Hauskeller (2013, 100) thinks that many people want to live forever sim-
ply because they imagine a radically different future. From my perspective, 
there is an assumption that in the future we will live better than now. H+ 
seems to consider only the success of (destructive) mind uploading, but it is 
also possible that life in the future could be more unbearable anything we 
could ever imagine. I would like to live a life in which I recognized myself. 
Kurzweil (2005) states that life will be better than now after the Singularity. 
We will have a brain and body beyond the limits of biology. He wants our 
existence to be as we need it and want it at any time. We will be the ones to 
create ourselves. Some human beings would want to have a different avatar 
every day; others would reject being able to imagine that they are angels and 
that they were born with feathered wings on their backs. Transhumanists 
want immortality, but they are mortal. They, and all of us, will be released 
from their biological chains after the explosion of the Singularity. They just 
need to be patient.7 However, what type of life we would live without death?
3. The defense of a specific type of indefinite life
3.1. Changing the concepts of “death” and “life”
In section 3, I have presented strong critiques to reject the dream of 
immortality. Now, I will defend my own approach. One of the question 
which started my argumentation was: “Do you want to live forever?”. In the 
literature, this question has also appeared as follows: “Is more life always 
better?” (Gems 2003). 
I say that it depends on many factors. Following my argument that 
the desire for ongoing life is context-dependent, most people will want 
to keep living if the set of circumstances is ideal for them; for instance, if 
they can continue to live with their loves ones, and under cognitively and 
7 The transhumanist perspective actually claims to want this vision of the future, rather 
than merely starting that “this is the inevitable future towards which we are headed”. The 
prediction of a certain future does not necessarily imply that this is what one wants. For 
many others, there is a very large gap between the future that may lie ahead and what 
they would really want.
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physically tolerable conditions. Upon assessing my current circumstances, 
today I would answer: yes, more life is indeed better. Nevertheless, I am sure 
that there could be a time when my circumstances change so much that 
I would not want to continue to endure them. If a digital immortal existence 
were ultimately boring or oppressive, I might desire to end it rather than 
endure it forever. I defend that the answer to the question will always be 
both personal and temporary. And it is difficult, if not impossible, for the 
person who wants to live to understand the perspective of a person for whom 
death is desirable. At the same time, no one knows for sure whether they 
will ever change their desire to live, or to die. The only question that I can 
possible answer is whether I myself would prefer to keep living rather die 
under the current circumstances. From my view, absolutely. I do not want 
to die today. I probably will not want to die tomorrow either. The fear of 
death is present in my current limited life. Does this imply my desire to live 
forever? Not really, as I will explain below.
The question is not only about the value of changing the concept of 
“death” but also the concept of “life”. Not being able to die, one of the 
greatest milestones that humans dream of, implies a radical modification 
of what we understand by our existence as humans. H+ promises to evade 
the “inevitable destiny” of death through an optimistic vision of future 
technology. However, what would be the price? According to my amendment 
to Hauskeller’s approach, we think about overcoming death from our finitude, 
but we also project the type of life we would like to live in the future. Now, 
if we were immortal would we want a similar life to the current limited one, 
in terms of our interests and values? It seems that, in one way or another, 
we would like to prolong a state of joy to infinity. We do not want what we 
do not know, what is beyond the limits of our mind, although this may be 
better. Our concept of “life” depends on who we are—it is the view from 
where we stand, so to speak. In other words, if we were not Homo sapiens, or 
even something similar, it is entirely possible that the concept of “life” would 
not exist—or at least, not in its current form. Enjoying certain activities or 
dreaming of a better future is specifically human. One question this raise is 
whether as a transhuman we would retain the same desire for immortality 
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that we have as humans. H+ takes one metaphysical step further by detaching 
itself from the biological body. If we cannot achieve the desired digital 
immortality, there is no reason to be uploaded. We would like to admire the 
sunset at Oriental Bay, read The Divine Comedy, or, watch Blade Runner 2049 
once again. In this dystopian movie, Ryan Gosling walks through a desolate 
and demolished planet Earth where all our omens have come true. However, 
this very pessimistic future is imaginable for us. Thus far, we project a life 
that is similar to the one that we live today. All of these activities would be 
possible in a virtual world as long as the upload is a success of H+. 
I argue that it is impossible to know whether I would carry out all of these 
activities in a way that is similar to what I want under current circumstances. 
I would like to keep living if and only if the type of life that I would lead 
were not radically different from the current limited life that I enjoy today. 
Now, would I want my mind to be in a virtual world or something like that? 
Kurzweil (2005, Ch. 7) considers that the meaning of life is to appreciate 
and create a kind of knowledge which improves itself to direct us towards 
a higher “order”. Therefore, death is a tragedy if a person’s information is 
lost in time. True immortality would only be possible if we uploaded our 
mind into a computer. I do not claim that meaning of the life as envisioned 
by H+ is the desire of all humans. Where they say “we”, they should say “I”, 
or “my colleagues”.
I defend a change in the concepts of “death” and “life” as follows: if X 
is death and Y is life, humans only worry about X without thinking that 
Y changes when X disappears. The interdependence between X and Y is 
so strong that we cannot imagine a world without X in which Y is still Y. 
A world without X in which Y is still Y is impossible because X does not exist 
anymore. Therefore, a world without X forces us to think of a world where 
Y becomes Y’. Transhumanists promise us a world without X in which Y’ 
will be radically different from Y. From the TH perspective, we should not 
fear Y’ for two reasons: (1) we would accept Y’ since it is the consequence 
of the conquest of X; and (2) we would accept that Y’ is not simply the 
consequence of the conquest of X, but also the possibility of living better 
than our current limited Y. However, if Y’ does not practically resemble Y at 
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all, is it worth conquering X? Most of society might want Y without X, but 
is it known that Y’ will in no way resemble our Y? Is it possible to imagine 
a life without death? Answering David Gems’ question, one could say that 
a longer life is not always a better life.
3.2. What do I want now?
Now, let me confess what my dream is. I imagine a life free of aging and 
other diseases that limit my activities, plans, projects, and time with my 
loved ones; a life in which I would (potentially) live forever because I want 
to keep living indefinitely. However, I cannot give an answer as to how many 
years I would like to live. 10 more years? 100 more years? Maybe, I would 
say, a little more for now. There are open horizons of possibilities which 
I would still like to explore. If you ask me in a distant future, in which the 
transhumanist purpose has come true, my answer would surely be different. 
I am afraid to close my eyes and not be able to open them once again, but 
what if, in a dystopian scenario, I was afraid of never being able to close 
them and always having to continue looking at a terrifying world? I imagine 
that nobody finds it desirable to die for what is known as external causes: 
accidents, dehydration, or murder, among other possibilities. I, under current 
circumstances, would not want to die from any of the above. I convert into 
a virtue what for H+ is a sign of weakness: the biological body. The fact of 
having it gives us the possibility to die both when we do not want and when 
we want to. One could desire life extension without desiring the immortality. 
On some occasions, one must sacrifice something to obtain something else.
Following my previous reflection, I fear X but I am aware that without 
X, I could not keep Y, at least as I know Y today. I do not defend a static Y 
because my circumstances are changing day after day. It is a Y recognized 
by me and those around me. I do not accept an unknown Y’ just to avoid 
X. What is more, I do not give up X to have an “eternal” Y’. Therefore, I do 
not accept what H+ defends: the desirability of uploading our minds into 
a computer. First, this desire is quite improbable to achieve in the future. 
Second, if it were real, this type of existence implies something unknown 
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that many people would not necessarily want. It is not, in other words, an 
inherent desirability.
This specific type of indefinite life that I think humans should seek lies 
between our current limited life and the dream of immortality: we would 
be assuming that it would be optional to want to keep living, that death 
would be avoidable for a certain time, and that it would be reversible, since 
we would have a “salvation”. We could continue adding years of life, but, on 
the other hand, we would be unless there are external causes the ones who 
we decide if we want to die. It seems to me, that this might indeed be the 
central point of the argument: what does one want, to live forever? No. To 
die? Also no. What is desired is the ability to decide to end.
My current concern is not wanting to die. Death is the end of my life. 
My desire is not to face the moment in which I will lose everything. I do not 
want to live forever and I reject the transhumanist dream. How can I accept 
what I can hardly imagine? If it were possible, I would want to live better 
as long as my life had a very similar meaning as it has today. These are my 
conditions, my set of circumstances, under which I accept the idea of an 
unending life. Everything would change under other circumstances. This 
is what I have called the specific type of indefinite life. 
I believe that I have answered the IF discussed by Hauskeller. Never-
theless, I need some more time to think about it.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have analyzed and discussed the transhumanist dream of 
immortality. First, I have suggested an amendment to Hauskeller’s approach 
of the IF. The key to disambiguating the IF is the imprecise premise “normal-
ly”. I propose a philosophical turn towards context-dependency, so that the 
desire to live is considered to be dependent on the circumstances of every 
individual. The value of death is related to these circumstances. Second, 
I have reviewed strong critiques against mind uploading in the literature. 
Two great challenges about mind uploading were presented by Chalmers 
(2010): the problem of consciousness and the personal identity dilemma. 
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According to the above, digital immortality could be a nightmare for humans. 
Death would be a “salvation” when we do not want to live forever, if and only 
if this were possible. Otherwise, the immortality will no longer be so much 
of a dream. Finally, I have argued in favor of a specific indefinite life which 
is more desirable than our current limited life. I would like to enjoy a life in 
which I would recognize myself, my loved ones, and the world where I live. 
Would there be anything better than deciding when is a good time to die? 
Once those things are no longer possible, my current fear of death should 
fade into acceptance and I would be released from this fear.
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